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ABSTRACT
Today, ensuring security in cyberspace is a top priority of national security policy for most states. 
States’ approaches to cybersecurity can be divided into two categories: those that regard cybersecurity 
as a civilian task; and those that involve their militaries in creating or implementing cybersecurity 
policies. Those states that have incorporated cyberwarfare into their military planning and organization 
perceive cyberattacks as a threat to their national security, while states that charge their civilian agencies 
with domestic cybersecurity missions classify cyber intrusions as security risks for only particular sectors. 
Adopting the framework of securitization theory, this article theorizes both civil and military approaches 
to cybersecurity and threat perceptions and their sources. The theoretical framework is then applied to a 
study of the cybersecurity policies of Central European countries and the Baltic States.
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INTRODUCTION 
Today, cybersecurity is increasingly regarded as a national issue affecting all levels of society 
(ENISA, 2012). Consequently, securing cyberspace has become an integral part of states’ national 
security policies. Cyberthreats have revolutionised the way people think about security and the 
rules and methods for safeguarding national security (Świątkowska, 2012). Although, defining 
cyberthreats seems to be problematic, almost all states agree that cyberspace threats and risks 
need to be specifically addressed in their national security policies. Countries around the world 
are, therefore, formulating cybersecurity strategies, usually by devising some kind of national 
legal act or programme to respond to cyberthreats and protect critical networks (The Cyber 
Index, UNIDIR, 2013). However, priorities for national cybersecurity policies vary by country. 
Some countries have a very clear vision of the cyber environment and its main referent objects 
such as critical infrastructure (CI), have formulated a comprehensive perception of issues that 
pose threats to cybersecurity and national security, and have identified the most dangerous 
source of cyberthreats. As a result, in these countries, tasking government agencies with 
cybersecurity management is a key condition for implementing effective cybersecurity policies. 
In contrast, states with a prevailing civil approach to cybersecurity are mainly concerned with 
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cybercrime. The potential sources of cybercrime risks are more diffused and primarily related 
to private property and the proper functioning of the economic sector. 
The roots of states’ different approaches to cybersecurity can be analysed from a theoretical 
point of view. There are competing doctrines for viewing cybersecurity issues. The so-called 
national security paradigm reflects the traditional role of the state in securing countries’ borders 
and enforcing the rule of law (Newmeyer, 2015). According to Harknett and Stever (2009), the 
cybersecurity issue is unique multifaceted, establishing cybersecurity requires states to secure 
public, private, and economic cyber activities. Cybersecurity is considered fundamental to a 
state’s military and economic security and as such is approached with traditional national 
security arguments based on protecting the homeland (Harnett and Stever, 2009). In other 
words, this approach emphasizes the link between the protection of critical infrastructure 
and those public and private systems that are important to the operation of the government. 
The national security paradigm refers to the top-down approach of managing and securing 
cyberspace risks in a manner that may result in increasing the military’s influence on cyberspace 
policies (Dunn Cavelty,2013). Therefore, the concept of cyberspace militarization can be analysed 
through the national security paradigm. 
In contrast to the military approach, the civil approach can be analysed through an economic 
lens. In this regard, the economic paradigm reflects the growing influence of the internet on the 
state’s economic well-being (Newmeyer, 2015). While the national security paradigm excludes 
all other sectors but the military from the processes of formulating cyberspace policies, the 
economic perspective emphasizes the importance of the participation of other sectors and 
institutions in the formulation of cybersecurity policies. According to Moore (2010), from 
the economic perspective, there are two necessary conditions to implementing a national 
cybersecurity strategy: 1) internet service providers should be held accountable for eliminating 
malware-infected computers on their systems; and 2) companies and other agencies should be 
required to disclose data breeches and control system intrusions. The economic paradigm refers 
to a decentralized approach among a group of agencies and actors responsible for cybersecurity 
management. In this approach, the burden of taking measures to protect systems as a whole 
is shared by the individual, service providers and the government. 
Both paradigms, national security and economic, suggest frameworks for a theoretical 
analysis of the process of creating and implementing cybersecurity policies. A variety of optional 
theoretical approaches could still be highlighted. The framework used in this paper is the 
securitization framework of the Copenhagen school. As Hansen and Nissenbaum note (2009), 
the understanding of security as a discursive modality with a particular rhetorical structure 
and political effect renders the Copenhagen school’s framework well suited to a study of the 
formation and evolution of cybersecurity discourse. Therefore, this article—based on the results 
of a qualitative study of the four Visegrad states (Poland, The Czech Republic, Slovakia, and 
Hungary) and the three Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia)—aims to: 1) investigate 
how the civil and military approaches correlate to securitization processes; and 2) contribute 
to understandings of differences in states‘s cyberspace behaviours and cooperation patterns 
in cyberspace.
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1. THE COPENHAGEN SCHOOL AND CYBERSECURITY
In the 1990s, securitization theorists such as Buzan, Weaver, and De Wilde did not perceive 
cybersecurity as an existential threat to states. However, as a consequence of the growing 
dependence of human societies on cyber networks, cybernetic issues are now securitized, 
suggesting that the materialization of this process is highlighted through an analysis of policies, 
institutional and strategic responses (Lobato, 2015). Thus, it is important to analyse, how states, 
acting as securitizing actors, become alert to the risks of cyberattacks and then establish a 
specific agenda to deal with threats. In this context, maintaining a secure cyberspace legitimizes 
the use of extraordinary measures.   The ability of an actor to successfully securitize an issue 
is highly dependent on their position. According to Buzan, security has, to some degree, been 
institutionalized and, therefore, “some actors are placed in positions of power by virtue of 
being generally accepted voices of security, by having the power to define security.” (Buzan, 
Weaver, de Wilde, 1998). A government’s cybersecurity policy would therefore seem to be 
an ideal vehicle for mobilizing, and perhaps also legitimizing, a securitizing move. A policy 
represents an administration’s official stance on an issue understood to be a problem and 
proposes solutions based on technical knowledge and research. In this regard, cybersecurity 
policies reflect in strategic documents, such as the national and cybersecurity strategies, the 
processes of defining cyberspace as a realm requiring security measures. 
Given this, I operationalize both military and civil approaches of cybersecurity in order to apply 
the Copenhagen school’s theoretical framework to my cybersecurity analysis. Thus, in countries 
with a military approach, the referent object is the protection of critical infrastructures and of 
governmental digital resources. Countries implementing this approach are usually technologically 
advanced, have larger economies, and rely heavily on cyberspace. With this dependency comes 
vulnerability and maintaining critical cyber infrastructure is considered the main condition for 
maintaining national security. Conversely, there is no specific referent object identified by civil-
oriented countries. These countries believe that cyberattackers are seeking immediate financial 
gain or seek to steal sensitive or provocative information. Since cyberthreats are closely linked to 
criminal acts, the main referent object varies from personal information to the proper functioning 
of information, economic, and social spheres, and other so-called soft sectors.
The second point made by the Copenhagen school is that the concept of security 
encompasses not only military, but also political, economic, and social aspects. Consequently, 
the perception of threats has also been expanded. Hence, in this article, it is important to analyse 
how countries perceive potential cyberattacks. Thus, states with a prevailing military approach—
due to their heavy dependence on their CI—view cyber issues as matters of national security 
and include cyberwarfare in their military planning and organization. It is worth mentioning that 
dimensions of national cybersecurity were established when computer intrusions (a criminal 
act) were clustered together with more traditional and well-established espionage discourse. 
In this regard, civil-oriented countries perceive particular cyber issues as security risks for only 
a particular sector, such as financial, social, or private spheres. 
According to the Copenhagen school, security discourse refers to the identification of the 
main source of threat. Although, the architecture of cyberspace makes it difficult to clearly 
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determine who initiated a cyberattack, the military approach usually focuses on foreign 
governments and rogue non-state actors as the sources of threat, while the civil approach 
concentrates on hacktivism and cybercrimes as the main sources of threat. Consequently, 
countries with a prevailing civil approach are less likely to envision external threats to 
cybersecurity. The actors posing the greatest threats in countries with a civil approach may be in 
the business of stealing personal identities to commit fraud, a crime that in the inter-connected 
world of cyberspace, renders everyone a potential victim.
Another stage of the securitization process is the acceptance and legitimization of the 
extraordinary measures offered by the securitizing actor. Therefore, based on this logic, the 
active engagement of military institutions in cybersecurity policy creation and implementation 
could be seen as one such extraordinary measure undertaken by countries with a prevailing 
military approach. The so-called militarization of cyberspace refers to the growing pressures 
on governments to develop the capacity to fight and win wars in this domain (Deibert, 2011). 
Therefore, the militarization of cyber space shall be considered a result of the securitization 
process. When cyber space is perceived as a source of threats to national security, governments 
strengthen their capabilities to offensively fight these threats. Meanwhile, civil-oriented 
countries are more likely to respond to perceived cybersecurity threats with civilian capacities, 
structures, and instruments as cybersecurity issues ultimately fall within the remit of interior 
ministries and civilian agencies.
While cyberspace is not specifically addressed by Buzan, Weaver, et al., the securitization 
theory could serve as the theoretical framework for the analysis of civil and military approaches 
to cybersecurity, their relevant premises are demonstrated in Table 1.
TABLE 1. Presumptions of military and civil approaches 
Civil Approach Military Approach
Referent security object 
Cyberattack perception  
Sources of cyberthreats
Private security, information and 
communications technology (ICT)
Criminal acts, security risks
Non-state actors, cybercriminals, 
hacktivists
Critical infrastructure, ICT  
National security threats 
Rogue states and non-state 
actors, cybercriminals, hacktivists
Institutions responsible for 
cybersecurity management
Interior ministries and civil 
agencies, etc.
Ministries of defence, other 
military agencies
2. OVERVIEW OF CYBERSECURITY STRATEGIES AND THE INSTITUTIONAL  
STRUCTURING OF CYBERSECURITY POLICIES
In the hierarchy of strategic documents, cybersecurity strategies are part of the national 
security or defence strategies and are connected to several other institutions’ strategies due 
to the all-encompassing impact of cybersecurity on society as a whole. The main goal of this 
section is to provide an overview of cybersecurity strategies of seven selected countries and 
the institutions engaged in the implementation of cyber policy objectives. 
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2 . 1  E s t o n i a
Estonia‘s strategic documents on cybersecurity and its institutional structures for maintaining 
cybersecurity have contributed to its mature and comprehensive cybersecurity culture and 
policies. This is a country where strategic planning comes first, ensuring the cohesion of the 
entire cybersecurity architecture. In response to a series of extensive hacking attacks in 2007, 
Estonia, in 2008, became one of the first countries in the world to adopt a national cybersecurity 
strategy. The hacking episode Estonia faced in 2007 has been called the first cyberwar, raged 
as a politically motivated assault, on a country’s digital infrastructure. After this “Cyber War I,” 
Estonia’s Ministry of Defence drafted a national cybersecurity strategy. Estonia has also published 
and launched Digital Agenda 2020 to create an environment facilitating the use of ICT and the 
development of smart solutions (Digital Agenda 2020 for Estonia, 2013).
Estonia has the most extensive range of institutional cybersecurity policies in the Baltics. 
The responsibility for coordinating Estonia’s cybersecurity policies overall was transferred from 
Estonia’s Ministry of Defence (MOD) to its Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications 
in 2011. As an interagency body, Estonia’s Cyber Security Council of the Security Committee of 
the Government has been supporting strategic level interagency cooperation and overseeing 
the implementation of the country’s cybersecurity strategy objectives. The Ministry of Defence 
is the coordinating authority for cyber defence in the area of national defence. In addition to 
the MOD, national cyber defence is supported by the Estonian Defence League’s Cyber Defence 
Unit that includes cybersecurity professionals from both the public and private entities. Since 
2008, Estonia’s defence forces have also hosted the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre 
of Excellence—an international military organisation focusing on enhancing the cyber defence 
capabilities of NATO and its sponsoring nations. 
2 . 2  L a t v i a
The Cyber Security Strategy of Latvia for 2014-2018 was adopted in 2014 (Cyber Security 
Strategy of Latvia 2014-2018, 2014). The strategy highlights the ICT security incidents in Latvian 
cyberspace and predicts that the country may be subject to increased cybersecurity risks in the 
future (Cyber Security Strategy of Latvia 2014-2018: 2014). The strategy also appeals to the 
Law on the Security of Information Technology which determines basic security requirements 
for state, municipal institutions, and providers of public electronic communications services, 
as well as supervisors of critical ICT infrastructure. Both documents reflect an integrated 
approach to the protection of Latvia’s cybersecurity and national security that prioritizes critical 
infrastructure and public services. 
Latvia’s elaborate and efficient institutionalization of its cybersecurity policies is well on the 
way to becoming a model system. Latvia’s National Information Technology Security Council 
coordinates the development of national cybersecurity policies and the implementation of the 
policies’ objectives and measures. The Council is the central national authority for the exchange 
of information and cooperation between the public and private sector and the Ministry of 
Defence coordinates the development and implementation of information technology security 
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and cyberspace protection policies. Naturally, there are some other entities—such as other 
ministries and a computer emergency response team (CERT)—that also implement Latvia’s 
cybersecurity policies. 
2 . 3  L i t h u a n i a
Lithuania’s management of cybersecurity threats has gone through a long evolution, starting 
from the creation of Lithuania’s first institutions for dealing with cybersecurity, to the recent 
passing of an overarching law on cybersecurity (Butrimas, 2015).. Lithuania is the only country 
in the Baltic region that has not approved a national cybersecurity strategy. However, Lithuania’s 
Seimas (parliament) approved a national security strategy, which declared cybersecurity a 
priority of national interest.  In order to ensure the security of Lithuania’s cyberspace, the 
Lithuanian government approved The Programme for the Development of Electronic Information 
Security for 2011-2019. The programme has three main objectives: 1) to strengthen the security 
of state-owned information resources; 20 to ensure that critical information infrastructure 
functions efficiently; and 3) to ensure the cybersecurity of Lithuania’s citizens and residents 
and persons staying in Lithuania (Resolution Nr. 796, 2011).  These objectives have been 
carried over to and further developed by Lithuania’s law on cybersecurity, approved in 2014. 
The significant outcomes of this law include transferring of coordinating national cybersecurity 
policies to the Ministry of National Defence (MoND), the establishment of a new operational 
National Cybersecurity Centre (NCC) and the creation of an Advisory Council on Cybersecurity 
chaired by the MoND (Law on Cyber Security of the Republic of Lithuania, 2014).
2 . 4  Po l a n d 
Poland enacted a long list of comprehensive changes to its cyberspace defence system Poland 
and managed to publish and implement a cybersecurity strategy. Furthermore, cybersecurity 
also became an integral part of Poland’s national security efforts and is frequently mentioned 
in other national strategic documents. 
The cybersecurity issue in Poland’s strategic documents was first mentioned in the National 
Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland in 2007. The document noted a direct relationship 
between cybersecurity and the country’s ability to function properly (National Security Strategy 
of the Republic of Poland, 2007). Later, the Strategy of Development of the National Security 
System of the Republic of Poland 2011-2022 detailed and developed the issues related to 
cyberspace protection in Poland (The Strategy of National Security of Poland, 2012). However, 
the first document dedicated solely to cybersecurity, Cyberspace Protection Policy, was not 
published until 2013 (Cyberspace Protection Policy of the Republic of Poland, 2013). In 2015, 
Poland’s National Security Bureau (BBN) published a cybersecurity doctrine (Świątkowska, 2012). 
The document further lays out work to be completed in order to improve national security in 
the realm of cyberspace. The doctrine also maps out tasks for state institutions, notably for 
security agencies, the armed forces, the private sector, and NGOs (Doctrine of Cybersecurity of 
Poland, 2015). The National Security Bureau, functions as the main entity—together with the 
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Ministry of Administration and Digitisation, the Internal Security Agency, and CERT—responsible 
for achieving cybersecurity objectives. 
2 . 5  T h e  C z e c h  R e p u b l i c 
The Czech National Strategy for Information Security approved in 2005 marks the Czech 
Republic’s first attempt to regulate its national cyberspace (National Strategy for Information 
Security in the Slovak Republic, 2005). In 2011, the National Security Strategy identified 
cybersecurity as one of the main priorities of the Czech government and placed cyberthreats on 
the same security-threat level as regional conflicts, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction 
(Security Strategy of the Czech Republic, 2011). In 2011 the Czech Republic approved its cyber 
security strategy and action plan for 2011 to 2015. The strategy primarily aimed to protect ICT 
systems in the Czech Republic and mitigate damage caused by cyberattacks (Cyber Security 
Strategy of the Czech Republic for years 2011-2015, 2011). In 2015, the Czech government 
approved its updated national cybersecurity strategy for 2015 to 2020. This strategy for the 
latter half of the decade includes a comprehensive set of measures that for achieving the 
highest possible level of cybersecurity (National Cyber Security Strategy of the Czech Republic 
for the Period from 2015 to 2020, 2015).
In the Czech Republic, civilian agencies are charged with implementing cybersecurity policy. 
The overall responsibility for national cybersecurity rests with the country’s National Security 
Authority. The National Cyber Security Centre, an agency within the National Security Authority, 
is part of the country’s national and international early warning system. Additionally, The 
Ministry of the Interior promotes cybersecurity issues at the political level while the Ministry 
of Defence only addresses cybersecurity issues cooperatively with NATO. 
2 . 6  S l o va k i a 
Slovakia developed a legal framework for cybersecurity in 2008 by adopting the National 
Strategy for Information Security of the Slovak Republic (NSIS) for 2009 to 2013. The strategy 
was drafted by the Ministry of Finance, Slovakia’s agency responsible for securing unclassified 
public administration information. In 2012, Slovakia launched its National Cybersecurity Strategy. 
The strategy was accompanied by the Action Plan, a report on the tasks of the NSIS.  Slovakia 
issued an information security plan for each year from 2009 to 2013. 
Slovakia’s National Security Authority manages classified information, while the Ministry 
of Finance manages the rest. Mutual communication is facilitated by the Ministry of Finance‘s 
Committee for Information Security, which has an advisory and coordinating role, preparing 
strategic and technical materials on information security. Some specific topics are supervised 
by the Security Council, the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defence. Thus, the Ministry 
of Defence does not have a direct role in national cybersecurity management. 
2 . 7  H u n g a r y
In 2013, Hungary adopted a national cybersecurity strategy which expressly states that protecting 
Hungary’s sovereignty in Hungarian cyberspace is a national interest (Government Decision on 
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the National Cyber Security Strategy of Hungary, 2013). Being aware of the fact that threats and 
attacks emerging in cyberspace may escalate to a level requiring allied cooperation, Hungary 
considers it highly important that cybersecurity has become an issue for a collective defence 
under Article 5 of the founding treaty of NATO. It is also worthwhile to note that cyberthreats 
are also prioritized in Hungary’s national security strategy adopted in 2012 (Government Decree 
on the Hungary’s National Security Strategy, 2012).
The main agency responsible for the coordination and implementation of cyber-related 
policies in Hungary is the National Cybersecurity Coordination Council. Additional institutions 
charged with aspects of cybersecurity: the Cybersecurity Authority (an agency within the 
Ministry of National Development), The National Security Office (an agency within) the Ministry 
of Public Administration and Justice, and CERT (an agency within).
2 . 8  Cy b e r s e c u r i t y  s t ra t e g i e s  i n  t h e  r e g i o n  o v e ra l l
This overview of the national cybersecurity strategies in the seven countries examined reveals 
that the region’s cybersecurity strategies are becoming integrated and comprehensive. The 
strategies approach cybersecurity in a holistic manner and encompass economic, social, legal, 
law-enforcement, military, and intelligence-related aspects of cybersecurity. Some strategies, 
such as those implemented in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, support a more flexible approach 
and emphasize the economic and personal (individual) dimensions of cybersecurity policy. 
Moreover, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary belong to a group of countries where 
civilian agencies are mainly in charge of ensuring cybersecurity. In this regard, cybersecurity 
in these countries can be described as civil-oriented. Military agencies are more active in 
coordinating and implementing cybersecurity policies in Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland. 
3. CYBERSECURITY AND ITS REFERENT OBJECTS
When using a securitization framework to analyse cyberspace defence, the referent object—that 
which is existentially threatened—is critical infrastructure. However, as Deibert and Saco have 
argued, cybersecurity is a terrain on which multiple discourses and (in)securities compete 
(Deibert, 2002; Saco, 1999). Therefore, discussions of cybersecurity hinge on competing ideas 
regarding cybersecurity’s referent objects (Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009). According to 
Hansen and Nissenbaum (2009: 1161), the key to understanding the potential magnitude of 
cyberthreats lies in acknowledging and understanding just how highly networked and integrated 
computer systems have become. These networks provide critical digital infrastructure: they 
regulate electricity, financial activities, energy use and even traffic patterns.  These networks 
are identified as a collective referent object and are usually securitized first, since their damage 
would present a threat to national security. 
The economic sector is also rich in referent objects including the private sector’s fear 
of hackers’ abilities to steal large sums of money and intellectual property owners’ worries 
that file sharing compromises their rights and revenues (Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009). In 
this regard, an individual approach to cybersecurity—stemming from cyber-libertarianism 
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prioritizing personal (or individual) security—prevails.1 As Hansen and Nissenbaum (2009: 
1163) have argued, in private security discourse the individual is not a referent object, instead 
the individual is linked to societal and political referent objects. In other words, cyber privacy 
defence has to be mediated through a collective referent object, either a political-ideological 
one—prompting questions regarding an appropriate individual-state balance—or a national-
societal one, which would mobilize values core to community identity. Similarly, securing critical 
infrastructure cannot stop at the infrastructure itself: the implications of a network breakdown 
imply other referent objects: society, the regime, and the economy (Hansen and Nissenbaum, 
2009). In order to link a theoretical perspective on the variety of referent objects with a study 
of cybersecurity in the Baltic states and Visegrad countries, requires an analysis of the referent 
objects identified by the states themselves. 
All seven countries acknowledge a link between the cyber- and national security sectors 
and are aware that cybersecurity issues—such as the destruction of the ICT system or critical 
infrastructure—can damage national security, adversely impact citizens’ lives, and threaten the 
assets and the proper functioning of the national economy and public services. Consequently, 
a collective security discourse prevails in all seven countries’ strategic documents. However, 
the countries—such as Estonia, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and to some degree, the Czech 
Republic—that articulate a strong need to intensively defend their cyberspaces also present, 
as reflected in their strategic documents, more comprehensive and clearer visions of their 
main referent objects. For instance, Lithuania’s national security strategy emphasizes the 
importance of ensuring the security of informational, economic, and social infrastructure as the 
key objective of national security policy (National security strategy of the Republic of Lithuania, 
2012). Meanwhile, the national cybersecurity strategy of the Czech Republic mainly prioritizes 
the protection of information infrastructure essential to Czech economic and social interests 
(Cyber security strategy of the Czech Republic for years 2011-2015, 2011); it also focuses on 
the protection of rights of internet users. However, the Czech Republic’s national security 
strategy presents a more comprehensive concept of critical infrastructure and its vulnerabilities 
coming from cyberspace than its national cybersecurity strategy does. The national security 
document states that critical infrastructure as a whole is exposed to a number of threats with 
natural, technological, and asymmetric aspects. Examples of such threats include cyberattacks, 
economic crime, and sabotage among others (Cyber security strategy of the Czech Republic 
for years 2011-2015, 2011). In other words, countries which are keen on securitizing their 
cyberspace, are more likely to prioritize the safety of critical infrastructure as a key condition 
of national security. Because national security is linked to critical infrastructure as the referent 
object, the actors with power to identify objects that require security and defence may claim the 
right to use extraordinary means in the name of security. For example, Poland’s cybersecurity 
doctrine emphasizes the importance of critical infrastructure and a direct relationship between 
1  More information on cyber-libertarianism can be found for example here: Hofman, J.,‘‘The Libertarian 
Origins of Cybercrime: Unintended Side-Effects of a Political Utopia‘‘. Centre for analysis of risk and regulation 
at the London School of Economics and Political Science, 2010. http://www.lse.ac.uk/accounting/CARR/pdf/dps/
disspaper62.pdf
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cybersecurity and the country’s proper functioning, including its economic development and 
the ability to operate effectively in the military sphere (Cyber security doctrine of the Republic 
of Poland, 2015). What is more, Poland is the only country which is willing to develop not 
only defensive but also offensive cyber capabilities in order to deter potential opponents in 
cyberspace (National security strategy of the Republic of Poland, 2012). Thus, Poland’s approach 
reveals that the more articulated the process of identifying and defending against cyberthreats 
is, the more militarized it becomes.
On the other hand, countries such as Hungary and Slovakia, also mention critical digital 
infrastructure as a referent object. However, these countries do not view potential attacks on 
critical infrastructure as a threat to national survival, as cybersecurity in these two countries is 
thought to be just one of several national security sectors. Hungary and Slovakia focus mainly 
on information security. The objectives of Slovakia’s information security strategy focus on 
protecting human rights and freedom, improving information security management, and 
defending state ICT in order to support the state’s critical infrastructure (National strategy for 
information security in the Slovak Republic, 2008). The concept of referent objects in Hungary’s 
cybersecurity strategy remains even more ambivalent, it lacks any direct reference to primary 
referent objects. The strategy only mentions protecting national data assets and the “operational 
safety of the parts of its critical infrastructures linked to cyberspace.” (Government decision on 
the National cyber security strategy of Hungary, 2013). Neither Slovakia nor Hungary identify a 
specific referent object that should be protected first within cybersecurity, as a consequence 
both countries have a decidedly civil approach to cybersecurity. 
4. PERCEPTIONS OF CYBERTHREATS
The securitization of cyber issues is based on different discourses, most commonly in 
national security discourse. Therefore, cyber issues usually arise when agents, such as foreign 
governments or non-state actors, with rogue intentions attempt to gain access to financial, 
energy, or public-safety systems and the prospect of cyberattacks is presented as a threat that 
requires an urgent response. Perceiving and presenting cyberattacks in this manner leads to 
intense security measures. Consequently, in countries where a national security discourse 
prevails, the threat of cyberattacks are regarded as a top priority and there is a military approach 
to cybersecurity. 
However, threats to cyber- and national security do not arise from external sources alone. 
Hence, cyberattacks can also arise from systematic threats. These systemic threats, defined 
by Hundley as ‘‘cyberspace safety’’ stem from the inherent unpredictability of computers and 
information systems, which ‘‘create unintended (potentially or actually) dangerous situations 
for themselves or for the physical and human environments in which they are embedded’’ 
(Anderson and Hearn, 1996). A more common issue, however, is intentionally provoked 
systematic threat invoked by criminal syndicates or individuals. In this regard, technical discourse 
is accompanied with a criminal one and is linked to cybersecurity discourse. In this discourse, 
cybersecurity can, in short, be seen as safeguarding computers from criminal activity and 
cyberattacks are perceived not as national security threats, but as common risks in the cyber 
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sector. Consequently, countries that perceive potential cyberattacks as a risk for a particular 
sector are less keen to define cyber issues as issues of national security and can be identified 
as civil-oriented states. 
Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and the Czech Republic have a multi-layered approach 
to cyberattacks. First, they evaluate risks to their national security and task state institutions 
with preventing cyberattacks. Secondly, they identify cyber-related challenges to the integral 
components of their national security: the economic, financial, and private sectors. This 
comprehensive approach to cyberattacks is reflected in Estonia’s cybersecurity strategy. Estonia 
claims that it has a growing number of state actors tasked with countering cyber espionage and 
protecting both internet-connected and closed networks, with the additional aim of collecting 
information on security and economic interests (Cyber Security Strategy of Estonia 2014–2017, 
2014). National security is also the prevailing discourse in Poland’s cybersecurity doctrine. 
The cyberthreats identified in Poland’s doctrine include attacks against telecommunications 
systems important to national security, and cybercrime—specific cybercrimes mentioned in 
the doctrine include “cyber violence, destructive cyber protests and cyber demonstrations,” 
data and identity theft, and private computer hijacks (Cyber Security Doctrine of the Republic 
of Poland, 2015). The same discourse is seen in Lithuania and Latvia‘s strategic documents. For 
example, Lithuania’s state defence concept groups cyberattacks as a national threat together 
with terrorism and organised criminal activities (The State Defence Concept of the Republic of 
Latvia, 2012). It is worth mentioning that Latvia’s newest national security concept highlights 
cyberattacks as one of eight primary national security threats (Press release, 2015).
The four countries mentioned above have a comprehensive approach to cybersecurity 
based on precise evaluations of the potential impact of cyberattacks on different sectors and 
on national security overall. Since the cyberattacks are perceived mainly as threats to national 
security, these countries have responded with a military approach. 
Slovakia’s updated cybersecurity concept for 2015 to 2020 also presents a complex 
perception of cybersecurity. Slovakia claims that cybersecurity should not be seen as an isolated 
problem of the Slovak Republic or as an issue isolated to one or even several sectors and that, 
due to its global nature, cybersecurity is a society-wide phenomenon (Cyber Security Concept 
of Slovak Republic for 2015–2020, 2015). The document also identifies the core problem of 
Slovakia‘s cybersecurity policy: that cyberthreats are not generally seen as a sufficiently urgent 
problem and are not explicitly or validly addressed in Slovak law (Cyber Security Concept of 
Slovak Republic for 2015–2020, 2015). While this document is instrumental in its nature, as it 
offers a model for managing cybersecurity policies, it lacks a complete vision of cybersecurity 
challenges. As a result, potential cyberattacks are seen mainly as risks to unnamed targets. 
The strategy of the Czech Republic mentions risks such as cyberespionage (industrial, military, 
political, or other), organized crime in cyberspace, hacktivism, intentional disinformation 
campaigns with political or military objectives, and even—in the future—cyberterrorism (Cyber 
security strategy of the Czech Republic for the 2011-2015 period, 2011). These risks are seen 
mainly as dangerous tendencies in the global cyberspace that have not yet threatened Czech 
society. The security discourse that prevails in the strategic documents of the Czech Republic 
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mainly refers to systematic threats and “computer safety.” In this regard, the Czech Republic’s 
cybersecurity strategy focuses mainly on building a credible information society by safeguarding 
access to services, protecting data integrity, and promoting the confidentiality of the Czech 
Republic’s cyberspaces (Cyber security strategy of the Czech Republic for the 2011-2015 period, 
2011). Meanwhile, Hungary also emphasizes the criminal element of cyberattacks. Thus, Hungary 
claims that dynamically developing new technologies, like cloud computing and mobile internet, 
lead to the continuous emergence of new security risks, such as illegal acquisitions of critical 
information and personal data (Government decision on National cyber security strategy of 
Hungary, 2013). Moreover, Hungary avoids identifying cybersecurity challenges with threats. 
It prefers to name cyberthreats as risks to the cyber sector. 
The perceptions of cyberthreats and cybersecurity in general, determine the civil approach 
to cybersecurity management that prevails in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary. 
5. SOURCES OF CYBERTHREATS
The cyberspace’s architecture facilitates anonymity and hinders attempts to track the sources 
of cyberattacks, constituting an additional factor of insecurity. Nevertheless, it is possible to 
analyse the sources of cyberattacks and cyberattackers, who may operate as functional actors. 
The logic of such analysis would be similar to what representatives of the Copenhagen school 
sketch out in analysing the pollution of the environment: these actors directly influence the 
dynamic of the cyber sector, but they are neither referent objects nor securitizing actors, though 
they may contribute to actions that impact the perception of the threat (Buzan, Wæver, and 
de Wilde, 1998). In a civil-military dichotomy, external cyberthreats such as foreign states or 
non-state actors, including cyberterrorists and cyberespionage agents, clash with internal actors: 
hacktivists,cybercriminals, malware authors, cyber scammers and corporations. As mentioned 
previously, countries that are actively securing their cyberspaces, emphasize the political 
motivation of cyberattacks and external cyberthreats. This attitude dictates a military approach 
to cybersecurity management as the most effective. Conversely, focusing mainly on internal 
cybersecurity threats means that the main referent object is the economic sector or private 
data. To fight these threats, a civil approach to cybersecurity policy is thought to be sufficient. 
Further analysis of how the sources of cyberthreats are understood by particular countries 
brings us to the conclusion that all countries acknowledge that there are many actors in 
cyberspace; however, only a few states make a distinction between nature, objectives, and 
methods of these actors. For example, Estonia‘s cybersecurity strategy claims that national 
cybersecurity is affected by the actors operating in cyberspace with various skills, targets, 
and motivations and that cybersespionage—with the intent to collect national security and 
economic information—is increasing. Estonia’s strategy also emphasizes that the number of 
states capable of and actually initiating cyberattacks is increasing (Cyber security strategy of 
Estonia 2014-2017, 2014). This distinction between internal and external threats is also made in 
the Polish doctrine. External threats listed by the doctrine include cyber crises, cyber conflicts, 
cyberwar, and cyberespionage involving states and other entities, “threats (for Poland) coming 
from cyberspace include extremist, terrorist and international criminal organizations whose 
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attacks in cyberspace can have ideological, political, religious, business or criminal motivations.” 
(Cyber security doctrine of the Republic of Poland, 2015).
Lithuania and Latvia, in contrast, haven‘t identified specific cyberattackers, but their strategic 
documents refer primarily to external threats, such as neighbouring countries. Meanwhile, both 
Slovakia and Hungary have quite a blurred and fragmental vision on the sources of cyberthreats. 
For example, Hungary focuses on technological (internal) vulnerabilities and their effects to 
the proper functioning of the state‘s economy without any deeper analysis of their causes and 
actors engaged into the process. The cybersecurity strategy of Hungary states that in addition 
to the damage caused by external factors, the inadequate regulation of the operational security 
of the information and communication systems constituting cyberspace poses a further risk. 
„Dynamic emerging new technologies, such as cloud computing or mobile Internet, lead to the 
continuous evolution of new security risks.“ (Government decision on National cyber security 
strategy of Hungary, 2013). The civil approach to the sources of cyber threats is also common 
to the Czech Republic. The National Security Strategy of the Czech Republic identifies a wide 
range of potential cyber challenges, however, almost all of them are criminal or technological 
in nature. These are hackers stealing personal or sensitive data, technological failures, botnets 
and DDoS/DoS attacks etc.  
The perception of cyber threats is closely linked to the sources of the perceived threats. 
The more securitized a view of cyber threat prevails, the more precisely the source of a threat 
is identified. What is more, countries that securitize cyber threats, such as Estonia, Poland, 
Lithuania, and Latvia, make a distinction between external and internal cyberspace actors. 
Meanwhile, countries that emphasize the criminal element of cyberthreats think about them 
as internal challenges and limitations of cyberspace. It is noteworthy that almost all of the 
analysed countries make a distinction between internal and external sources of cyber threats 
in their strategic documents. However, the countries that are described as civil-oriented are 
not keen on elaborating this distinction further and focus mainly on internal threat sources as 
the most common and probable in their security environment. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The qualitative analysis of the cybersecurity policies of the four Visegrad countries and the 
three Baltic states shows that each of these countries have cybersecurity strategies and 
corresponding laws to address cybersecurity issues. All of the documents analysed refer to 
higher-level national security or defence strategies and present the legislative environment, 
although there are significant differences in their profundity. Different cyberspace entities and 
the potential threats these entities generate are also addressed in the documents. In most 
national cyberspace security strategies, threats to critical infrastructure and cybercrime play 
a prominent role and indicate increasing economic damage wrought by cyberattacks. In the 
formal sense, the domain of cyberspace is already included in the security agendas of all states 
and could be called “securitized.”
However, there are differences of securitization among countries. Cybersecurity differs by 
how countries: 1) define a referent object (what should be protected); 2) perceive primary 
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threats and risks; and 3) identify the sources of threats and risks. In accordance with these 
differences, countries can be classified into two categories. The first category, that of countries 
that militarize cybersecurity issues, includes Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, and, to some degree, 
Latvia. These countries that have militarized cybersecurity discourse are more precise in 
identifying specific referent objects and in articulating the defence of these objects as national 
priorities. This tendency elevates cybersecurity to the highest national security level and 
focuses on safeguarding ICT and governmental information resources. Poland, Estonia, and 
Lithuania tend to identify cybersecurity challenges as threats to the proper functioning of the 
state, and identify attacks from foreign states as the most dangerous sources of such threats. 
Consequently, in these states, the responsibility of responding to cyberthreats is handed over 
to military and defence institutions (Table 2). 
The second category of securitization discourse refers to the criminalization of cybersecurity 
issues. The Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary rely on a civil approach to maintain 
cybersecurity. Their referent objects are diffused and mainly related to the proper functioning 
of the state’s economic system and private property. The ICT and governmental digital resources 
have no priority over other legitimate referent objects. As a result, countries with a prevailing 
TABLE 2. Civil and military approaches in the states’ cybersecurity policies 
Referent Object
Cyber Attack 
Perception
Threat Source Institutions
Militarization/ 
Criminalization
Hungary
Digital informational 
infrastructure
Risk to national 
cybersecurity
Internal 
technological 
vulnerabilities
Civil 
Criminalization 
approach prevails
Czech 
Republic
Critical & 
informational 
infrastructure;
rights of internet 
users
General risk 
of a global 
cyberspace
Internal 
technological 
vulnerabilities
Civil
Criminalization 
approach prevails 
with military 
elements
Slovakia
Digital informational 
infrastructure, 
human Rights & 
freedoms
Risk to the 
national 
cybersecurity 
Internal 
technological 
vulnerabilities
Civil 
Criminalization 
approach prevails
Poland
Critical & 
informational 
infrastructure
National threat 
External & internal 
actors
Military 
Militarization 
approach prevails
Lithuania
Informational, 
Economic & Social/
Critical Infrastructure
National threat
Usually external 
actors
Military
Militarization 
approach prevails
Latvia 
Critical & 
Informational 
Infrastructure
National Threat
Usually 
external actors, 
neighbouring 
countries
Military 
Militarization 
approach prevails 
with criminal 
elements 
Estonia 
Critical & 
Informational 
Infrastructure
Threat to 
economic, 
political & 
other sectors
E External & 
internal actors
Extensively 
militarized
Militarization 
approach prevails
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civil approach are mostly concerned with criminal activity conducted in cyberspace and describe 
cybersecurity issues as “risks”. Potential sources of such risks are also fragmented and include 
not only external international actors, but also internal actors such as hackers, hacktivists, 
criminal organisations, and even the unintentional disruption of networks. Civil institutions in 
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary are charged with monitoring cybersecurity risks and 
coordinating state response to cyber incidents (Table 2).
The conclusions of this article, the categorisation of cybersecurity approaches as civil or 
militarized may lead to a better understanding of cybersecurity as a phenomenon. It could 
contribute to the explanation of obstacles for cooperation between states dealing with 
cybersecurity issues on the international level. Furthermore, the identification of different 
approaches to cybersecurity could explain specific state‘s actions in cyberspace. Understanding 
states’ differences in perceiving cyberthreats, referent objects, and potential adversaries 
constitutes a background to discussions of the so-called cyber-identities of states and non-
governmental actors. This could be a useful theoretical tool for analysing potential cyber 
conflicts and cooperation patterns in further studies.
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